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Institutional changes in the Swedish meat industry1 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – To explain institutional changes in the Swedish meat industry after major external 
events. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Analyses based on secondary data sources and interviews 
with people involved when the dominant meat co-operative in Sweden underwent major 
changes.  
 
Findings – The decline in the Swedish meat industry is interpreted using the theory of 
institutional change presented by Aoki (2007; 2011). The country’s former national 
agricultural policy created a specific set of norms and values. Co-operatives were considered 
to be indispensable. The co-operative sector was large and hierarchically organised. 
Therefore, external signals did not create sufficient endogenous processes within the co-
operatives. Co-operative adaptation to rising competitive pressure took place only reluctantly 
and belatedly. Hence many farmer-members defected and the major co-operative faced 
finally unsurmountable problems. A strong ideological conviction caused the once dominant 
co-operative to collapse and much of the Swedish meat industry to disappear. 
 
Originality/value – This study shows that strong ideology (here a conviction about the 
advantages of politically governed co-operatives) can hamper endogenous processes within 
an organisation. Management may ignore outside influences, to the extent that even a large 
industry is impaired. Other large, hierarchically structured and top-governed organisations 
with a strong ideology may behave in a similar way.  
 
Keywords Institutional change, slaughterhouse, co-operative, conversion, Sweden, 
agricultural policy 
 
Paper type Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1999, four regional meat co-operatives in Sweden had operational problems, so they took 
the first step towards merging into an almost nationwide co-operative, which had an 
aggregate market share of 60-80% of the market for slaughtered animals. The full merger 
took place in 2001. In spite of its market dominance, the co-operative’s financial performance 
kept on weakening. In 2007 it was acquired by a multinational meat processing firm, since 
the farmer-members considered it impossible to rescue the business. By then much of the 
once strong meat sector had already disappeared.  
 
This study aims at explaining these institutional changes in Sweden’s meat industry. It is 
claimed that the demise of the co-operative sector can be understood in terms of endogenous 
processes, spurred by some political (exogenous) changes (Aoki, 2007; 2011).  
 
Many previous studies have investigated co-operatives that have run into difficulties, using a 
variety of theoretical bases such as cultural theory (Hogeland, 2006), population ecology 
(Bager, 1996), social capital theory (Nilsson, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2012), the notion of 
“vaguely defined property rights” (Cook, 1995), transaction cost theory (Harte, 1997), 
management theory (Hind, 1999), the notion of free-riding (Nilsson and Svendsen, 2011), 
social psychology (Nilsson, Kihlén and Norell, 2009) and sociology (Ilmonen, 1992). The 
present study is the first to use the theory of institutional change to explain why a co-
operative collapsed – and thereby caused a decline in an important industry. 
 
Section 2 of this paper presents the external factors that created problems for the meat co-
operatives studied here. One such factor is that Sweden’s longstanding agricultural policy 
was dismantled in 1990. Another is that in 1995, Sweden joined the European Union (EU) 
and cheap imported products became highly demanded by consumers. The meat co-operative 
sector in particular was deeply affected by the low-price competition.  
 
Following that background, Section 3 provides an account of the theory of institutional 
change, which is used here to interpret the developments in the Swedish meat industry. 
Section 4 presents the methodological deliberations in connection with collecting and 
analysing empirical data and the data are analysed in terms of the theory of institutional 
change in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 conclusions are drawn from the results.  
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 The national agricultural policy  
 
In 1990 Sweden dismantled its national agricultural policy, which was first introduced in the 
1930s following an economic crisis. It was expanded during World War II and the difficult 
years thereafter. This policy became increasingly all-encompassing over the next decades. An 
important instrument for realising the policy was the existence of farmers’ co-operatives. 
Government subsidies to agriculture were allocated through farmers’ organisations, first a 
federal agricultural organisation and then a co-operative society. The amount of subsidy 
funding was decided after bargaining between the farmers’ federation and a specific 
government body.  
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The agricultural policy aimed at providing “self-sufficiency for defence reasons … 
environmental protection … a fair income goal … the protection of backward areas and the 
production of 'high quality' food” (Rabinowicz et al., 1986, p. 325). These objectives were 
achieved through varied import levies to raise domestic prices, mandatory domestic market 
intervention implemented by semi-public marketing associations and export subsidies, funded 
by variable production levies (Rabinowicz, 2004, p. 2). 
 
Swedish farmers’ organisations had an “almost complete monopoly” (Rabinowicz et al., 
1986, p. 323). The intention was that if the co-operatives could achieve a large market share, 
“the price support would not be captured by the middle-men even if the price-regulating 
measures were implemented beyond the farm gate at later stages of the marketing channel” 
(ibid., pp. 326-327).  
 
All co-operatives and all farmers were dependent upon the farmers’ federation’s price 
negotiations, so a strict hierarchal pattern existed. Farmers had strong incentives to become 
members of a co-operative (Micheletti, 1987). Only a few farmers had such strong anti-co-
operative convictions that they patronised the small number of weak investor-owned firms 
(IOF), thereby simultaneously resisting social pressure from their fellow farmers (Pestoff, 
1991) and the widespread co-operative ideological values about solidarity, fairness and 
equality (Nilsson, 1997). However, those farmers still received good prices thanks to the 
government policy (Rabinowicz et al., 1986, p. 327) 
 
The political support made it possible for the co-operatives to become very wealthy, because 
“... the protection system now favours the processing industry rather than the farmers”. 
(Rabinowicz et al., 1986, p. 331) 
 
According to the competition policy of those days, the co-operatives were not permitted to 
compete with each other. They were allotted geographical borders, outside which they were 
not allowed to buy agricultural products or market their processed products. The co-
operatives used the traditional co-operative principle of delivery obligations, i.e. their 
members were obliged to deliver all their products to the co-operative. Product volumes 
which the co-operatives could not sell within their region were sold to co-operative 
federations within each of the agricultural industries. Most of these organisations had sizeable 
processing activities. Volumes that could not be sold on the domestic market were offloaded 
on the world market.  
 
In 1990, the Swedish Parliament decided unanimously that the country’s agricultural policy 
would be abolished. The support for agriculture was considered a heavy burden on the 
national economy.  
 
2.2 Sweden’s accession to the EU  
 
The abolition of the policy was intended to take place over a five-year period. However, only 
limited liberalisation measures were introduced. There was a widespread opinion that swift 
deregulation was not necessary, since Sweden was expected soon to become an EU member 
country, whereupon the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would be implemented in 
Sweden (Rabinowicz, 2004). Accession to the EU took place in 1995.  
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After Sweden’s entry into the EU, imported food products acquired a large share of the 
market, as consumers were more attracted to the low prices than to domestic origin. Swedish 
food processors were forced to reduce their selling prices, but they could not pass on these 
reductions in prices to farmers, because few farms would have survived in that case.  
 
The Swedish meat industry declined continuously following EU accession. The total number 
of pigs decreased by 40% between 1995 and 2013, while the number of pig breeders fell by 
80% between 2000 and 2013 (Swedish Board of Agriculture, 2013). The number of pigs sent 
to slaughter fell from 1,239,000 in 1999 to 847,000 in 2013. Nevertheless, consumption of 
meat steadily increased, with the increased demand being met by imported products. For 
example, the per capita consumption of pig meat rose by 5% between 2000 and 2010 
(Swedish Board of Agriculture, 2014).  
 
2.3 The meat co-operatives2 
 
There have been many local and regional meat co-operatives in Sweden since the first one 
was established in 1899. After many mergers had taken place, in the early 1990s there were 
five regional co-operatives, which together accounted for 70-90% of all the animals 
slaughtered (pigs, cattle and sheep). The meat co-operative sector also comprised a national 
federation, which owned several processing plants. The co-operatives dominated not only the 
market for slaughter animals but also later stages in the value chain, although with 
successively lower market share, for example about 30% of meat products sold to end 
consumers.  
 
Once Sweden had joined the EU, the co-operatives’ business operations faced great economic 
problems (Nilsson, 1997). The managers of the regional co-operatives decided that a merger 
would be a solution. The negotiations failed, however, so in 1999 four of the five co-
operatives agreed to establish a collaborative arrangement, called Swedish Meats (Swedish 
Meats, 1999). It was hoped that the cultures in the merging partners would be aligned to pave 
the way for a future full merger.  
 
Renewed negotiations resulted in a merger decision in 2001. However, merging into one 
primary co-operative did not result in better performance. For example, even though four of 
the previous seven processing plants were closed, Swedish Meats still had excess capacity. 
Half the aggregate equity capital the co-operatives possessed in 1995 was lost by 2003.  
 
Due to unremitting losses, Swedish Meats ultimately had to lower the prices paid to its 
members. Hence, the membership fell from about 33,000 in 2002 to 22,000 in 2006. As the 
exiting members were mainly large-scale farmers, the allocated equity capital of Swedish 
Meats fell by 50% in the same period. The number of animals sent to slaughter also declined. 
For example, in 2000 Swedish Meats accounted for 77% of the country’s slaughter pigs, but 
by the end of 2006 its market share was 63%.  
 
In the first three years after the merger, Swedish Meats made large annual losses (see Table 
I). For example, in 2002 the loss corresponded to 14% of the equity capital. In later years 
there were some improvements, possibly as a result of closure of redundant production 
                                                          
2 This section is based on secondary material, especially annual reports from Swedish Meats (1999-2007), 
Nilsson and Björklund (2003), Andersson and Thorstensson (2010), Lind (2011), Hess et al. (2013) and mass 
media.  
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plants, but possibly also due to the Board of Directors realising that the enterprise had to be 
sold and therefore no investments were made, thereby creating an advantage in negotiations 
with prospective buyers.  
 
In 2007, a majority of the delegates at Swedish Meats’ General Assembly decided to sell the 
business. The buyer was a profit-maximising meat processing firm with operations in most 
countries around the Baltic Sea. This firm is listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange, but most 
of the directors are from a society of Finnish animal producers.  
 
During the years when the co-operatives had economic problems, there were also a small 
number of IOF slaughterhouses, mainly family-owned businesses, in Sweden. These 
businesses expanded their volumes in connection with EU accession. They were most often 
profitable even though they paid higher prices to farmers than Swedish Meats. In some 
regions where Swedish Meats had closed production plants, farmers established new abattoirs 
(Hakelius et al., 2013). The regional meat co-operative that did not join the four others in the 
merger was sold a few years later to a Danish meat processing firm.  
 
Table I. Selected financial figures from the five full years when Swedish Meats was operating 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Net sales, million SEK 9,157 8,648 8,287 8,872 10,038 
Profit/loss after interests and tax, 
millions of SEK 
124 -154 63 33 62 
Operating profit/loss (comparable 
units), millions of SEK 
-5 -128 -5 2 -47 
Cash flow, millions of SEK 406 -105 94 -7 -208 
Equity ratio, % 32 30 30 31 27 
(Source: Swedish Meats’ Annual Report, 2006. SEK 100 = EUR 9.25, USD 8.12 and GBP 12.84 on 22 June 
2015) 
 
3. The theory of institutional change 
 
The changes within the Swedish meat industry described above, especially those in the co-
operative business sphere, can be understood with the help of the theory of institutional 
change. Using North (1990) as his point of departure, Aoki (2007, p. 6) suggests that 
institutions are “self-sustaining, salient patterns of social interactions, as represented by 
meaningful rules that every agent knows and are incorporated as agents’ shared beliefs about 
how the game is played and to be played.” Institutions thus constitute sets of rules and norms, 
conceptions and ideas, all of which direct the behaviour of individuals, groups and 
organisations. Because the rules and norms evolve sequentially, the concept of ‘path 
dependence’ has become a hallmark in the literature on institutional change.  
 
Aoki (2011) provides “a unified framework for incorporating various views of institutions” 
(ibid., p. 21). Institutional changes occur constantly within all social settings, be it industries 
(the Swedish agricultural sector at large), organisations (co-operatives, other meat processing 
firms, retailers or farmer organisations) or networks (the farmer community, consumers or the 
general public). Institutional changes are partly triggered by events that are external to the 
social system. In the case of the co-operative demise studied here, the exogenous influences 
were above all political changes. Other external factors may be consumers’ shifting demand, 
intensified competition, product and organisational innovation, and criticism by researchers 
and mass media.  
6 
 
 
All actors within the meat industry had to respond to these external factors, but the various 
categories of actors responded differently, thus changing the conditions for other actors to 
react. Hence institutional changes take place endogenously, i.e. through forces within various 
parts of the social system itself. These units interact simultaneously and reciprocally, so there 
are influences between them. According to Aoki (2007), changes occur within various 
domains (“proto-institutions”):  
 
 The economic exchange domain may comprise the values and norms within the co-
operatives under study here, the investor-owned competing slaughterhouses, and the 
various firms in the value chain, including the primary producers.  
 The organisational exchange domain involves a variety of organisations such as the 
co-operative enterprise studied here with its board, management and staff, the co-
operative society and various organisational levels within that hierarchy, the federal 
co-operative organisations, other food processing firms and retailers in the value 
chain, etc.  
 The political exchange domain comprises politicians in various organisational 
contexts and their voters, but also the farmers’ lobbying organisations. The leaders of 
the co-operatives, especially before the crisis, belong to the political sphere.  
 The social exchange domain contains the animal-rearing farmers – both members of 
the co-operative and those delivering to investor-owned slaughterhouses. The general 
public is interested in agriculture, taxes, food product origin and many other topics.  
 
When actors within one domain change their rules and norms and thereby their behaviour, 
actors in another domain will face a different reality. Therefore they in turn change their 
minds and their actions, causing yet others to change, and so on. Each actor may act in a way 
that is expected to serve their own interests, but due to the interplay with other actors who act 
in a similar way, everybody’s interests may change over time.  
 
Institutional changes are often associated with tensions within and between the domains, such 
as within and between units, for example politicians of different persuasions, management 
and the members of farmer organisation or producers at different stages of a value chain. 
These tensions urge actors to consider their opinions and their interaction with other actors. 
Changes outside the social system may give rise to external influences, which stimulate 
endogenously induced changes to become stronger.  
 
Institutional changes may be viewed in terms of games, played by a variety of players and 
categories of actors with relationships to a social system. The strategic interactions of agents 
and their individual beliefs in societal games have implications for the role of culture, 
institutional complementarities and policies. The players have their own set of conceptions, 
beliefs, opinions, etc. – in short, culture – and each player has different information and 
different interests and capabilities. The players’ actions are based on beliefs about how other 
players will behave. Hence actors change their norms and rules after having tried to anticipate 
the changes in other actors’ norms and rules, and these other actors in turn change in response 
to what is happening with yet other actors. When “the rules of the political exchange game 
start to be modified, that would … have feedback impacts on the corporate organization field 
in one way or another” (Aoki, 2011, p. 28).  
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The actors involved in restructuring the Swedish meat industry were politicians, the co-
operatives’ governing bodies (Board of Directors and other elected representatives, as well as 
the top management), the IOF slaughterhouses, the animal-producing farmers and different 
categories of these (co-operative members and IOF suppliers), academics, the general public 
and the mass media. Some of these players acted in ways that changed the conceptions of 
others. These players had the possibility of acting in two or more of the four domains, which 
meant that they had ample chances to reciprocally influence each other, thus creating 
snowball effects.  
 
Institutional change occurs in the competition between various norms, rules, ideologies, ideas 
and other conceptions that contribute to directing people’s actions and interactions. These 
conceptions are represented by various individuals and groups of individuals, each 
consciously or unconsciously influencing others. New conceptions are born as existing 
conceptions are mixed or integrated into others. All conceptions are borne by individuals, 
acting on their own or within various social and organisational contexts. Individuals have 
various conceptions because these are expected to benefit them.  
 
4. Methodological approaches  
 
The present study is based on both secondary and primary sources. Facts about the Swedish 
agricultural policy, the country’s accession to the EU and the development of the meat 
industry originate from secondary sources.  
 
The amount of secondary data about co-operative development during the crisis years is 
limited by the fact that the directors gave little and skewed information to the mass media, 
including the agricultural media. Moreover, as Swedish Meats was a co-operative, there was 
little interest from financial analysts and business news media.  
 
It was not possible to obtain direct information through a survey of members of Swedish 
Meats, since after the co-operative was sold no list of names and addresses of former 
members survived. Instead, primary data were obtained from individuals involved in Swedish 
Meats in the period when the co-operative was undergoing crisis. Thus individuals involved 
in attempts to rescue the co-operative and then to sell it were interviewed here. Interviews are 
the best data collection tool when individual historical accounts about a change are sought 
(King, 1994).  
 
The interviewees within the former co-operative include directors who had taken an active 
part in the decision to sell the co-operative and other members. Of special interest were those 
who had publicly expressed an opinion for or against the sell-off. All the people targeted for 
interviews had been members of the co-operative. However, most of the directors who acted 
for the demutualisation declined to participate.  
 
At the end of May 2009, semi-structured interviews were conducted. The plan was to 
interview a large number of people, but as one respondent after another gave very similar 
answers, only six interviews were held. The interviewees had received in advance a list of 
questions, which covered issues such as the deliberations concerning the institutional 
changes. The questions were of an open-ended nature in order to enhance the flexibility, 
stimulate in-depth answers and allow the interviewee to produce unanticipated answers 
(Robson, 2002). All interviewees agreed to the interviews being recorded. The recordings 
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were transcribed and the interviewees had the opportunity to comment on the transcripts and 
confirm their validity.  
 
Due to the sensitive nature of the issues, two-way communication between the interviewer 
and the interviewees was required. The interviews were held over the telephone and lasted 
between 30 and 75 minutes each. Telephone interviews result in information losses due to 
lack of visual cues, but this may be counterbalanced by the smaller interviewer effect and 
lower tendency for socially desirable responses (Bradburn and Sudman, 1979).  
 
The results of the interviews as well as the information presented in Section 2 are subject to a 
theoretical interpretation in Section 5, with occasional direct quotes from the interviews to 
support a particular point. For reasons of confidentiality, the interviewees are only numbered.  
 
The six interviewees (here presented in random order) were or had been: a director of 
Swedish Meats; a chairperson in Swedish Meats’ supervisory board; a chairperson of 
Swedish Meats; a director of Swedish Meats; a chairperson of a farmers’ society in the meat 
industry; and an elected representative at the second highest hierarchical level of the co-
operative society. 
 
5. Analysis  
 
5.1 The national agricultural policy 
 
During most of the era of Swedish agricultural policy the politicised co-operative model was 
a “convention” (Aoki, 2007, p. 13) embraced by citizens, consumers, farmers, farmers’ 
organisations and politicians of all colours. There was largely consensus that agriculture 
needed government support. The hierarchical order, with the farmers’ federation at the top 
and farmers at the bottom, created a corporatist-like structure in Swedish agriculture.  
 
There were shared beliefs and common knowledge about a specific co-operative ideology, 
e.g. that there should be solidarity between farmers (Nilsson, 1997); that suppliers in even the 
most remote districts should have the transport costs covered by the co-operative; and that 
ownership of the co-operative should be collective (Fahlbeck, 2007). This institution was 
more or less in equilibrium, with the exception of the few farmers who delivered to IOFs 
despite the disapproval of others.  
 
The successful lobbying by the farmers’ organisations for support for agriculture was the 
result of a “linked game” (Aoki, 2007, p. 15). The farmers’ representatives obtained political 
support within the political domain, legitimacy and trust from farmer-members in the social 
exchange game, acceptance from suppliers, other businesses and consumers in the economic 
exchange domain, etc. Through this game, the institution of politically supported co-
operatives was corroborated. 
 
Aoki (2007, p. 17) explains the linkages between domains in terms of “institutional 
complementarities”. Thus the representatives of the farmers’ organisations treated the 
institutions within one domain as a parameter within another domain. These representatives 
were highly respected in the farming community, but had also good political connections. 
Co-operatives gained acceptance through the arguments that traditional co-operative business 
firms act to the benefit of society and that co-operatives constitute social movements. 
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In the mid-1980s a diverging position was taken by some academics, who asserted that the 
institutional structure within the agricultural sector was inherently inefficient. This tension 
was uncovered by some journalists who saw personal advantages in allying themselves with 
the researchers. During subsequent mass media activities the general public gained the 
impression of farmers as social welfare claimants, paid with tax-payers’ money. The result 
was that in 1990, the Swedish Parliament decided to dismantle the national agricultural policy 
and allow Swedish agriculture to operate under world market conditions.  
 
During the debate about the liberalisation of Swedish agriculture the leaders of farmers’ 
organisations expressed support for the new political conditions, even though they had fought 
for continuing support for agriculture a few years earlier. These farmers’ representatives 
realised that it would be impossible to change the opinion of the public, politicians, the mass 
media, etc. Furthermore the co-operatives were so large, wealthy and market-dominating that 
it was difficult to conceive of a future in which they could be threatened. There may have 
been some “hubris and overconfidence” (cf. Fulton and Larson, 2009, p. 2). The leaders also 
enjoyed so much respect among the membership that they did not have to fear much 
opposition. The information asymmetry was large; farmers had learned to trust their 
representatives, so “normative conformity” existed (Dequech, 2013).  
 
There was a mentality of grandiosity in the entire organisation, which felt as if it belonged to 
the politically regulated era. (Interviewee 4)  
 
However the farmers’ leaders, just like farmers in general, had no experience of farming 
without government support and they hoped that such support would continue, although in 
some other way. One argument was that Sweden would probably soon join the EU with its 
CAP, which would provide a shield. This assertion was obviously not correct but it came to 
constitute a common belief in the farming community. Arguments made by the leaders of the 
farmers’ organisations were not questioned.  
 
In spite of the parliamentary deregulation decision and the support expressed by farmers’ 
representatives for this decision, the previous political mentality within the agricultural sector 
persisted. The hierarchical order within the farmers’ organisations prevented the elected 
representatives from stating deviating opinions. Most representatives wanted to be re-elected 
to their prestigious positions. There were social sanctions that prevented new ideas and 
solutions (Dequech, 2013). “The hindering factors are conservatism among members and 
difficult institutional conditions with regard to legislation and public opinion.” (Nilsson, 
1997, p. 62).  
 
My reflection is that we lacked competencies. (Interviewee 5)  
 
Hence the abolition of Swedish agricultural policy did not lead to major endogenous 
processes in the minds of farmers and their co-operative representatives. This absence of 
adaptation was due not least to the fact that further government deregulation measures were 
largely postponed owing to the expected entry into the EU. 
 
5.2 Sweden’s accession to the EU 
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Swedish meat producers were not prepared for the influx of imported goods following EU 
accession and the meat co-operatives did not undertake any major strategic changes. In 
accordance with the culture within the co-operatives, the decision-makers convinced each 
other and farmers that in the long run, consumers would remain loyal to products of Swedish 
origin.  
 
The Swedish meat industry, the farmer co-operatives, were very badly prepared for the EU 
accession and never kept up, regrettably. … The imports surprised those who were 
responsible for the slaughtering at the time of the EU accession. (Interviewee 3) 
 
In the 1990s the co-operatives no longer had any influence in the political exchange domain. 
After foreign products became increasingly popular among consumers, the co-operatives had 
difficulties in parts of the social exchange domain because their legitimacy in relation to 
consumers and the general public was vanishing. The co-operatives’ role in part of the 
economic exchange domain was also challenged as regards relations to retailers and 
consumers. Hence, the main arena that remained for the farmers’ representatives was the 
social exchange domain, limited to farmer-members.  
 
For the co-operative leaders, it was important to maintain good relations with the farmer-
members. Hence, the co-operatives sought to retain the support of members by paying a 
higher price for animals than they could afford (Interviewee 1). The co-operatives thereby 
drained their accumulated savings, but their leaders had still faith in the strength of the co-
operative model.  
 
The Board of Directors was incompetent in relation to their task … they lacked knowledge 
and courage. It is difficult to communicate to the members that we’ll have to lower the prices 
in order to make it. … There was too much politics … They discussed everything except the 
things that were really important for the ability to pay for the animals. (Interviewee 5) 
 
In relation to the farmers, the co-operatives tried to maintain a balance between the social and 
economic domains. The members were told that the co-operatives’ operations were under 
control. The farmers’ product prices were unaffected and in any case the farmers could not 
access the capital in the collective funds, which covered the losses. A challenge to the co-
operative leaders’ belief was that some farmers’ trust in the co-operatives deteriorated and an 
increasing number of members began delivering their animals to competing investor-owned 
slaughterhouses.  
 
It was felt that the Board to some part was quite paralysed and did not have any visions and 
ideas and initiative to survive this. (Interviewee 4) 
 
5.3 The meat co-operatives  
 
The attempt to solve the co-operatives’ problems by amalgamating the four regional co-
operatives resulted in 1999 in a loose coalition, but in 2001 the almost nation-wide Swedish 
Meats was established. However, this merger was based on political considerations rather 
than economic reality.  
 
Swedish Meats was thoroughly politicised. (Interviewee 5) 
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The merging partners were quite unequal in terms of financial strength, operational attributes 
and co-operative policies (Nilsson, 1997; Svensson, 1997). The cultural and economic 
differences not only postponed the merger for two years, but continued to create conflicts 
between the representatives, especially the merging partner with many large pig producers 
and that with many suppliers of dairy cattle. The new co-operative also comprised both 
Southern Sweden (with intensive agriculture) and the North (with few and dispersed farms). 
The result was that the membership was very heterogeneous (Interviewee 6). The members’ 
interests were thus difficult to align and the possibilities to run efficient operations were 
circumscribed. The disputes partly paralysed decisions about efficiency raising measures. 
 
The merger was intended to cut costs but no measures were considered. (Interviewee 1) 
 
The directors of the two major merging partners could not reach agreement about who should 
have the leading positions. There were two separate endogenous processes, linked to these 
two former co-operatives. The disputes could be understood in light of the tradition of 
hierarchical organisational structures in the co-operative sector (Interviewee 4). The 
chairpersons had the power to support farmer-members and representatives in their own 
region. Each tried to use their network within staff and members. In reality, neither of the two 
wings represented the entire membership. The conflict was partly a result of different 
conceptions of co-operative business principles.  
 
There was a political power game among the elected representatives of gigantic proportions. 
(Interviewee 4)  
 
The conflicts within the Board of Directors meant that Swedish Meats did not undertake 
sufficient measures to reduce its cost level. For example, even though the number of 
subsidiary companies was reduced, the Board of Directors chose to let the top managers 
remained employed, in other high-salaried positions (Interviewee 5).  
 
So there are these “popes” [former Chief Executive Officers] who remained after the merger 
and each of them … refused to loosen their grip and would not leave their position. 
(Interviewee 1) 
 
The members were aware of the conflicts between their leaders (Interviewee 1). Their 
confidence in the co-operative declined as the mass media reported how these conflicts 
hampered efficiency measures.  
 
It was about leadership … If the co-operative had had the right chairman… this person would 
have been able to make some tough decisions and pedagogically explain them … A person 
with strong leadership skills could have compensated for the heterogeneous membership … 
(Interviewee 5) 
 
As Swedish Meats made losses, its reputation became increasingly poor within the 
membership. Thus more and more members chose a free-rider policy, selling their animals to 
IOF slaughterhouses. They realised that the co-operative’s business operations were 
untenable. It was easy for members to defect, but more difficult for them to fight for the co-
operative to become successful (Interviewee 1).  
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The members wanted better prices for their animals and they got that or, putting it differently, 
they got a better payment than the co-operative could afford and the result was this. At the 
same time as they wanted better payment, they didn’t want to restructure the [co-operative] 
organisation. They wanted to have, but not to give. (Interviewee 5) 
 
Within a subgroup of farmers a mentality evolved; any farmer wishing to be regarded as 
modern, successful and good at business had to leave Swedish Meats and deliver to an IOF. 
As this opinion became more widespread, the number of exiting suppliers increased (Lind 
and Åkesson, 2005). These farmers were predominately large producers, so Swedish Meats 
also lost much equity capital. The remaining member-suppliers thus bore an increasingly 
heavy burden. Hence smaller farmers also had an incentive to leave ‘the sinking ship’. This 
‘bank run’ continued for some time and many members exited. According to Dequech 
(2013), the sequential development of positive norms in relation to IOF slaughterhouses was 
due to “coordination and increasing returns to adoption”. 
 
People already had zero confidence in Swedish Meats and that could not be repaired. 
(Interviewee 6) 
 
As Swedish Meats’ financial crisis worsened, the controversies between the two stronger 
merging partners faded away. Ultimately, some directors left their positions a few years 
before Swedish Meats finally collapsed. Many new directors were elected, but by then 
Swedish Meats’ reputation among farmers was beyond repair.  
 
The primary task of the new directors was to find an alternative organisational solution 
(Interviewee 1). Because a statement on selling Swedish Meats would have been quite bold, 
the Board started by leaking to the media that Swedish Meats wanted to form an alliance with 
a stronger firm (Interviewee 3). It was later announced that Swedish Meats had to sell its 
operations. When the General Assembly voted to sell the co-operative, the conflict between 
the small number of pig breeders and the larger number of dairy producers was evident.  
 
Mainly the pig farmers said “no” and especially those from the production intensive regions. 
The [merger] decision was actually forced through by the weaker regions with dairy cattle. 
(Interviewee 4) 
 
In summary, Swedish Meats’ failing adaptation to new market conditions related to its 
organisational attributes. It was by far the largest firm in the industry, so the decision-makers 
considered it to have all necessary expertise inside the organisation and were unreceptive to 
signals from outside. For an extended period it was possible to keep the support of the 
farmer-members. The size and wealth of the organisation meant that there were good career 
opportunities for farmers to become elected representatives at increasingly high levels of the 
organisational hierarchy. Members had good reason to be compliant and normative 
conformity could be achieved.  
 
The co-operative’s heritage from the governmental agricultural policy explains the 
hierarchical organisational structure both in the business firm and in the co-operative society. 
These organisational attributes hampered endogenous learning processes. The organisation 
did not consider itself to have much to learn from outside.  
 
6. Conclusions  
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The institutional changes within the Swedish meat industry during recent decades, following 
abolition of the national agricultural policy in 1990 and Sweden’s accession to the European 
Union in 1995, were analysed here using institutional change theory. In an attempt to manage 
the new market conditions, four out of five meat co-operatives merged in 2001 but this 
nation-wide co-operative had to be sold in 2007. The meat industry at large declined because 
the market-dominating meat co-operative collapsed.  
 
Institutional changes took place successively, with each actor’s beliefs, conceptions, 
expectations and other cognitive states influenced by those of other actors in a large 
interactive system. Swedish researchers inspired the mass media, which affected public 
opinion, resulting in Parliament abolishing Swedish agricultural policy. The farmers’ leaders 
were forced to support this political decision and use their authority to convince farmers that 
Swedish agriculture would survive. Similarly, they succeeded in reassuring farmers when 
Sweden joined the European Union and cheap imported food posed a threat to Swedish 
producers.  
 
The co-operative members at large remained as suppliers for an extended time, even though 
the co-operatives performed poorly. One explanation is that the members had the same co-
operative culture as the elected representatives and the business organisation. This is likely, 
because the co-operative repeatedly informed them about the merits of the existing co-
operative structure and there were marked informational differences between the members 
and the leaders. However, after the small, weak IOF slaughterhouses reorganised so that they 
could pay higher prices for farmers’ animals, it became evident that many farmers had no co-
operative loyalty. Those who exited worsened conditions for remaining members and farmers 
with large production enterprises were more prone to exit. A new culture evolved among 
farmers, praising IOFs and criticising co-operatives.  
 
The meat co-operatives’ orientation towards the old political market hindered their adaptation 
to new commercial market conditions, where they had to compete with cheap imported food 
products. In accordance with the political mentality there were internal power struggles, 
which delayed reforms.  
 
All the actors involved in the development acted in a way that was consistent with the set of 
norms that existed in their social context at the time when they were in charge of decision 
making. Nobody can be blamed for the development. Those involved can rather be seen as 
victims of the past, in this study tracked back to the former agricultural policy.  
 
This case shows that ideologies can survive in an organisation despite external influences. 
Both the management and the Board of Directors adhered to the conceptions of co-operative 
management that dominated during the years of Swedish agricultural policy. Seen from the 
leaders’ perspective, this strategy was rational. By adhering to the old ideology the 
individuals retained their power for several years. This came to an end eventually, however, 
as the leaders had no power over other actors within the value chain, including the farmer-
members.  
 
Situations similar to that described here may occur in other organisations which have a 
glorious history. There are other collectively governed and hierarchically structured 
organisations with power concentrated at the top. These attributes hamper external influences 
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and therefore endogenous thought processes get less stimulation. Such organisations may 
have a strong ideology that serves to isolate them from the outside world. These ideologies 
may be political, religious, or – as in the present case – a conviction about the benefits of 
politically governed co-operatives.  
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